On Jan 29th 2026, Bridge Moris submitted the following proposal to the Electoral Reform Committee, following the PMO's call for proposals concerning the upcoming electoral reform. This proposal took two months to draft, and is the product of considerable research. Through it, we are honoured to represent all of the diaspora members who want to be enfranchised.
Executive Summary
For too long, a significant segment of our citizens – our diaspora – has been subject to systemic democratic exclusion, a state of affairs inconsistent with Mauritius’ standing as a leading, forward-thinking nation. Rectifying this disenfranchisement is a moral and constitutional necessity; it restores the fundamental right of citizenship to those abroad, thereby reinforcing the democratic and kinship ties that bind the global Mauritian community, while also benefitting the country. By validating the diaspora’s stake in our national future, the State incentivizes a shift from personal remittances (currently 1.9% of GDP) toward high-impact, strategic, and long-term national investment.
This proposal submitted by Bridge Moris, a Mauritian diaspora engagement platform, advocates for the establishment of a dedicated twenty-second Constituency representing the diaspora-at-large. Unlike models that link overseas voters to their last domestic residence—which can distort local results—a dedicated constituency creates a targeted parliamentary voice for global Mauritians. The 22nd Constituency ensures direct representation while protecting the electoral sovereignty of resident citizens.
To mirror global democratic standards set by over 100 nations, we recommend that the State uses two distinct, secure voting channels simultaneously:
1. Consular Voting: Utilizing Mauritius’ network of missions for secure, in-person balloting to build initial institutional trust.
2. Electronic Voting: Integrating electronic voting systems which will allow the many Mauritians who do not live near embassies or consulates to exert their democratic right to vote, which is essential to truly enfranchise the diaspora.
This dual-track approach is designed to be efficiently integrated into the government’s Digital Transformation Blueprint (2025–2029), providing an inclusive ‘global nation’ model that unlocks a new pillar of national resilience.
We believe the enfranchisement of the diaspora is not merely a social concession but a strategic necessity for our democratic, forward-thinking Republic.
Introduction
According to the United Nation’s International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the Mauritian diaspora comprises an estimated 188,406 individuals around the world.[1] This number, however, is generally considered to be an underestimation, as it only takes into account those Mauritian citizens who have resided in Mauritius and then emigrated: it does not include Mauritian citizens born abroad and who reside abroad, for instance. Mauritian citizens, media figures and policy makers have often estimated that the ‘true’ figure ranges from 200,000 to 500,000.[2]
Whatever the exact figure, what is clear is that a considerable number of Mauritian diaspora members maintain strong cultural, economic, and familial ties to Mauritius, and many have attempted over the years to start movements allowing them the right to vote. Two petitions were created in 2019 alone – an election year in Mauritius – to attempt to convince the government to let the diaspora vote; they garnered a few thousand votes between them, which is an adequate performance considering how difficult it is to reach Mauritians abroad beyond connecting through personal and geographical circles.[3]
The current electoral framework offers no mechanism for Mauritian citizens to vote unless they travel physically to Mauritius and are listed on the Register of Electors, which requires a specific home address (registered public officerscurrently abroad are the exception here, as they can vote by proxy).[4] Members of the Mauritian diaspora have vocalised their continued dissatisfaction with this state of affairs over the years, expressing a sense that they have been disenfranchised of an essential democratic right that is granted to diaspora citizens of over a hundred countries. An additional forty or so countries are moving to grant voting rights to the diaspora within the next few years.[5]
Mauritius is lagging behind globally in terms of diaspora voting rights, but also regionally, too, which is surprising considering that the island is one of the top countries in Africa for business, economic growth and stability.[6] In Sub-Saharan Africa, over 90% of countries have significantly revised or drafted new constitutions since 1990 and many of these constitutions now explicitly enfranchise non-resident citizens, according to Dr. Nathan Allman and Dr. Elizabeth Wellman.[7]
Diaspora voting rights have led to economic growth and increased resilience in many parts of the world
Over a hundred countries have amended their laws to allow their diaspora members to vote; over the years, these changes in law have been studied by numerous researchers, who have sought to analyse (among other things) the possible ties between diaspora enfranchisement, economic growth and cultural attachment to one’s home country. A general conclusiondrawn by these studies is that political empowerment through the right to vote leads to stronger economic engagement, which often shifts from altruistic remittances to strategic investment. We shall briefly outline two such cases below:
(i) Cabo Verde witnessed soaring economic growth once the government allowed its diaspora to vote from abroad, gave them a form of representation in parliament and crafted financial instruments that enabled diaspora-led investment in the Republic. In 1991, Cabo Verdeans abroad were allowed to vote and were given parliamentary representation. Within the next decade, the World Bank noted that considerable financial flows from the diaspora was leading to heightened economic growth;[8] the Republic’s government capitalised on this by issuing investment bondsand creating a ‘Citizens House’,[9] a one-stop-shop facilitating investment in the island.[10] Over the years, the World Bank elevated Cabo Verde to upper-middle-income status. Real GDP growth reached 7.3% in 2024, [11] fuelled by a surge in fixed investment (+53.7%), much of which was diaspora-led.[12]
(ii) Mexico’s diaspora investment programme, Progama 3 x 1 para Migrantes [Appendix A] saw a massive surge in funding within two years of its diaspora being given the right to vote: the program’s federal budget climbed from USD 15 million in 2007 to over USD 42 million by 2008.[13]
Within the Mauritian context, we believe that the success of recently provisioned diaspora initiatives – such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) Diaspora Cell and the Diaspora and PMO’s Global Advisory Council – is contingent upon sustained political buy-in from overseas citizens. Without the formal recognition provided by the right to vote, these bodies risk being perceived as purely symbolic rather than substantive. Enfranchisement transforms the diaspora from passive observers into active stakeholders, ensuring that the Diaspora and Global Advisory Council is populated by engaged constituents and that the MFA Diaspora Cell operates within a high-trust environment. In this sense, voting rights are the foundational democratic cement that ensures that planned and upcoming state-led initiatives deliver on their mandates of national development.
Tackling arguments against diaspora voting rights
Whether expressed on-air in radio debates, in newspapers or in living rooms across the country, a few arguments are made time and time again concerning diaspora voting rights in Mauritius.[14] We thought it’d be beneficial to address these arguments here, before detailing our proposal on how diaspora voter enfranchisement could be enacted in Mauritius.
The first set of arguments states that a diaspora member shouldn’t be allowed to vote, because voting is tied to a person’s geographical constituency (through the Electoral Register), which the person no longer physically inhabits. Questions raised in this vein often revolve around the particular ‘ties’ that a person still has to their constituency while abroad: How does one assess the solidity or legitimacy of such ties? Does the diaspora member have enough knowledge of their political candidates of their constituency if they’ve never met them in person? A more tangible argument revolves around the following question: what if a disproportionate number of diaspora members live in a particular constituency –wouldn’t that create a disproportionate electoral response?
Debates on the constituency of the voter, their eligibility and its attendant complications can be bypassed in full if Mauritius adopts a diaspora voting reform similar to the French electoral system,[15] as will be discussed in the next section, whereby diaspora voters don’t vote as per a constituency, but for a Member of Parliament that represents their current geographical region. Diaspora members, in addition, would only be able to vote in the general elections (and not the municipal elections). This system also assuages the fear that a large diaspora could radically influence the outcome of a national election, and that results would effectively have been determined from abroad. With clear candidates representing global regions, and one or two seats in parliament, voting rights can be granted whilst electoral power remains, largely, with citizens residing in Mauritius.
The second argument states that only citizens residing in Mauritius and who pay their taxes should be allowed to vote. The residency principle is one model of political membership, but not the only historically viable one. Benedict Anderson, the great political scientist and historian, whose book Imagined Communities is required reading in university syllabi across the world, demonstrates that nations are held together by shared media, language,
institutions and memory — all of which can and do cross borders. The hundred or so countries that grant diaspora voting rights do so in the cognisance that their overseas citizens often retain economic, familial and political stakes, and that tax can’t be the supreme deciding factor in who gets to vote where.
If voting rights rested on purely economic considerations, it would be crucial to point out that many domestic groups who pay little tax (dependents, the formally unemployed) still have political rights because democratic legitimacy rests on membership and rights, not strictly on fiscal contribution. Moreover, diaspora members often continue to have material ties (property, investments, remittances) and social stakes (family welfare, pensions, land rights) that make them legitimately invested in domestic governance: the World Bank states that over Rs 13.3 billion was invested in Mauritius by diaspora members in the form of personal remittances (comprising personal transfers and compensation of employees) in 2024, which represents, clearly, a significant financial contribution to the local economy (1.9% of the GDP in 2024).[16]
The third set of arguments states that enabling diaspora voting rights could result in unclear political financing practices, with no control over where those funds are funnelled and what outcomes they may lead to. The electoral reform that Bridge Moris envisions is anchored in specificity and transparency, leaving no room for ambiguous interpretations of who counts as a diaspora member, how diaspora members can vote and how political parties are funded and how they use their funds, among many other criteria.
Linked to the points made above, a fourth set of arguments claims that some politicians benefit from strong ties to the diaspora, which could enable them to access unprecedented levels of political power if the diaspora were allowed to vote. This is true; however, time is on every political group’s side here, if the proposal leads to reform by late 2026 or even early 2027. The state of communications and technology today can rectify the influence of a prominent party or two.
Diaspora voting rights in practice around the world
There are numerous paths that Mauritius could follow when it comes to diaspora voting rights. For instance, in terms of implementation, France, Egypt and Japan enable their citizens to vote in person at their embassies and consulates; in the UK, Germany and Switzerland, one can mail-in one’s vote; Estonia and France, with their solid digital identity systems, carry out electronic voting, and in France and Belgium one can also vote by proxy. Though voting mechanisms differ between countries, with most of them relying on physical consulates, there is a global shift towards active digital registration and remote voting, in most cases after voting in embassies and consulates has been established. As we will explain in the next section, consular voting is the first and fundamental stepping stone towards establishing diaspora voting rights, and should be paired with electronic voting at this stage in our country’s development.
Beyond voting mechanisms, each country also has its own criteria as to who is eligible to vote. In the UK, for instance, a British national can vote outside of Britain if they were previously registered to vote in UK elections, including as an overseas voter, or if they were previously resident in the UK before moving to an address abroad.[17] Italian citizensliving abroad and regularly registered with A.I.R.E may exercise their right to vote abroad in their place of residence for national elections.[18] Given these two examples, for instance, it would be important for Mauritius to consider what kind of criteria it would demand of its diaspora citizens: the island could, like the UK, demand prior registration in Mauritius as a voter, or model themselves on the Italian system and demand that overseas residents keep themselves regularly registered (which would require the creation of a Register of Mauritians Living Abroad).
One must also consider the ways in which diaspora votes are integrated into the national voting system. Once again, there are a number of different mechanisms in place around the world. Eighteen countries including France, Italy and Columbia provide dedicated seats for diaspora members in the legislature; Croatia,[19] Peru, and Ecuador[20] use a national Proportional Representation list, capped at a certain number of seats; a few nations, such as Cabo Verde,[21] Lebanon[22]and the Cook Islands use or have used a mathematically discounted Weighted Voting system, though this solution has almost never been used in practice – it is constitutionally fragile and unpalatable to many policy makers. In some instances, Proportional Representation, Weighted Voting and Dedicated Seats are used together in some combination in the same election (Cabo Verde, Lebanon).
A Diaspora Constituency: A pragmatic approach to incorporating diaspora voting in the Mauritian Electoral System
We believe that there are excellent learnings to be gained from analysing the French electoral system.
In France, there are 11 constituencies (districts) specifically for French citizens living abroad. Each district covers a geographic region (the first district is North America; the 11th is Asia/Oceania). Each district elects its own Member of Parliament. In addition, there are 12 senators who represent French nationals living outside France, who are elected indirectly by the Assembly of French Citizens Abroad (a body of 442 advisors elected by the diaspora).
French diaspora members can vote in-person at the nearest French embassy or consulate; they can vote by Proxy at designated polling stations and can even vote by post. The French ‘system’, as it were, occurred in the context of a major constitutional reform in 2008, with the first-ever election for the 11 seats occurring in June 2012. Mauritius could benefit from France’s fifteen-year expertise in such matters when considering its own policies in the context of an electoral reform.
Mauritius currently has 21 constituencies. The government could consider adding a 22nd constituency to the list, representing diaspora voters worldwide, in the case of a general election.
Bridge Moris proposes that, in a first pilot phase of the diaspora voting rights project, a safe, secure voting system could be established in each of Mauritius’ twenty or so consulates, missions and embassies around the world, combined with an electronic voting system that would enfranchise hundreds of thousands of Mauritians who cannot travel to embassies and consulates – who, in fact, may be living in countries that don’t have a Mauritian embassy or consulate at all.
Consular voting is feasible, straightforward and is used by over a hundred countries around the world; it is a practice that has been established over decades. Embassies and consulates are – or should be – replete with security, making voting a safe exercise that builds trust in Mauritius’ good governance. A collaboration of sorts could even be organised between the embassy, the embassy’s host country and an independent body such as the UN, if there is any additional fear of ballot tampering. A citizen would then arrive, present their passport or ID card,[23] be verified by the embassy staff and then proceed to cast their ballot. The whole exercise could – and should – be independently audited. Once votes are counted around the world, the political candidate with the most votes will be elected as Member of Parliament representing the diaspora-at-large.
Voting by proxy should be a possibility at the embassies, but it is significantly more cumbersome as a measure and less secure, requiring a highly trustworthy, multi-step administrative chain, with no guarantee that the person who was given the proxy has voted in the desired way by the person voting by proxy.
When it comes to electronic voting, Mauritius could follow France and Estonia’s example. France uses a system that has rigorous security checks and evaluations, with independent audits and institutional oversight; Estonia, in the 2023 parliamentary elections, became the first country in the world where 51.1% of all votes were cast online. Its End-to-End Verifiability method allows the voter to verify whether their vote was properly cast and recorded; it also allows for dual verification (where the vote on one device is checked by securely logging into another).[24] The government of Mauritius could also investigate other solutions such as the use of blockchain technology, which acts as an immutable ledger which can be independently audited. Technological options should be feasible – seamlessly integrable, even – with the government’s plans to launch the Mauritius Digital Transformation Blueprint (2025-2029), and is briefly explored in Appendix B.
Bridge Moris’ actions in the electoral reform
Beyond the proposal, once the news calling for proposals was broadcast, Bridge Moris set up a petition called ‘Diaspora Voting Rights in the Mauritian Electoral Reform’[25] on 3 December 2025. So far we have had more than 500 votes in favour of diaspora voting, a number that we believe will continue to increase as our outreach increases. We are also confident, given this data, given the other petitions set up over the years and given our knowledge of the diaspora base, that if the electoral proposals bear fruit, there would be tens of thousands of politically-engaged Mauritians ready to register to vote abroad.
Another Mauritian diaspora cultural organisation, Siloy, partnered with us in a survey that they launched on 4 December 2025 to Mauritian diaspora members residing in France. Out of the 55 respondents, 93% believed that Mauritians should be able to vote abroad and over 90% wanted the diaspora to be represented in parliament. In a question that asked which voting method respondents believed should be authorised by the state, 85% said that they would like to see the state authorise electronic voting, and only 49% said that they would like to see the state authorise voting at a designated embassy or consulate. To us, this means that it’s now high time for a forward-thinking government to lay the foundations for diaspora voting rights: lagging behind would be an impediment to Mauritius’ stable, successful and democratic image, and an untapped source of economic development.
Going forward
Bridge Moris submits this proposal to support a forward-looking, inclusive, and equitable electoral system for Mauritius. Introducing diaspora voting is both feasible and aligned with global democratic standards; setting the foundations for voting rights by enabling Mauritians to vote electronically and through their consulates is the right step forward now for our island nation, as we strive to build a healthier, more democratic and more prosperous country.
Appendix A
Mexico launched its Programa 3x1 para Migrantes in 2002. The Program supports Mexicans living abroad to develop social infrastructure and productive projects in their hometown communities, with the participation of the federal, state and local government. For each dollar invested by the diaspora member, the federal government, the state and counties invest 3 dollars.[26] Once Mexico granted its diaspora citizens the right to vote in 2005-2006, the program saw a massive surge in funding in the next two years, with Mexico has recently implemented a robust internet voting system in 2024, which allowed its diaspora to vote in record numbers (with 180, 676 diaspora votes in 2024 compared to 98, 854 votes in the 2018 Presidential election). We can expect donations via the Program to increase accordingly.[27]
Appendix B
The Estonian system, in particular, relies (at least partly) on an identification card that is made secure through a chip on the card. This chip uses the same underlying technology as bank cards and SIM cards (UICC, or Universally Integrated Circuit Card, sometimes referred to as JavaCard). The technology used for those ID cards is called Open-EID. It's an open source initiative, so Mauritius could adopt the Estonian model rather seamlessly; another wonderful benefit is that some of the engineers who built the Estonian system offer consultancy services, which would further ease implementation.
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Aparicio, Javier, and Covadonga Meseguer, ‘Collective Remittances and the State: The 3x1 Program in Mexican Municipalities’, World Development, 40.1 (2012), 206–22 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.05.006
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‘Italiani all’estero: Voto all’estero’, Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale https://www.esteri.it/en/servizi-consolari-e-visti/italiani-all-estero/votoestero/ [accessed 7 January 2026]
Janvier, Nshimiyimana, Jonathan Ngugi, and Djuma Sumbiri, ‘Blockchain-Based Voting for Diaspora Communities: A Secure Remote Solution’, Journal of Information and Technology, 5.12 (2025), 30–43 https://doi.org/10.70619/vol5iss12pp30-43-695 [accessed 21 January 2026]
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Yamauchi, Shuji, and Takashi Sekiyama, ‘Comparing the Election Systems for Overseas Constituency Representatives in Multiple Countries’, Social Sciences, 13.177 (2024), 1–13
Thanks and Acknowledgements
Bridge Moris would like to thank Akhilesh Issur for their initial feedback on this proposal, and the Siloy association for their support and collaboration.
[1] E. A. Liaga, Assessment of the Use of Administrative Data on Migration in Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2024).
[2] ‘Fibre patriotique: Maurice veut se rapprocher de sa diaspora’, Défi Media, 2024 https://defimedia.info/fibre-patriotique-maurice-veut-se-rapprocher-de-sa-diaspora [accessed 7 January 2026].
[3] One of the petitions was created after the electoral result, but not in the context of any proposed electoral reform. The petitions can be accessed at: ‘Electoral Commissioner of Mauritius: Vote by Post/Proxy for Mauritian citizens abroad’, Avaaz https://secure.avaaz.org/community_petitions/en/Electoral_Commisioner_of_Mauritius_Vote_by_PostProxy_for_Mauritian_citizens_abroad/[accessed 7 January 2026]; and ‘Right to vote for all Mauritian citizens living abroad’, Change.org https://www.change.org/p/government-of-mauritius-right-to-vote-for-all-mauritian-citizens-living-abroad [accessed 7 January 2026].
[4] ‘Communique: Voting by Proxy’, Office of the Electoral Commissioner Mauritius, October 2024 https://electoral.govmu.org/oec/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Communique-Voting-by-Proxy.pdf [accessed 7 January 2026].
[5] India is moving towards implementing an ‘Electronically Transmitted Postal Ballot System’ to allow the diaspora to vote without having to travel back to their home constituency; Armenia and Panama now allow their citizens to vote electronically, among other countries.
[6] See ‘Mauritius ranked Africa’s most stable country for 2025’, CNBC Africa, 5 December 2025 https://www.cnbcafrica.com/media/7764935068809/mauritius-ranked-africas-most-stable-country-for-2025 [accessed 12 January 2012].
[7] The authors refer, for instance, to Kenya’s 2010 Constitution that mandates the ‘progressive’ right for diaspora Kenyans to vote. N. Allen and E. I. Wellman, ‘Extending Voting Rights to Emigrants: A Global Analysis of Actors, Processes and Outcomes’, Diaspora Studies, 17.1 (2024), 1–17 (p. 5).
[8] World Bank, Cabo Verde: Country Economic Memorandum (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007).
[9] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ‘Cabo Verde Hoists the Blue Flag: The First Blue Bond and its Blue Finance Ambitions’, UNDP News, 23 January 2023 https://www.undp.org/blog/cabo-verde-hoists-blue-flag [accessed 15 January 2026].
[10] European Union Global Diaspora Facility (EUDiF), Cabo Verde Diaspora Factsheet (Brussels: EUDiF, 2020) https://diasporafordevelopment.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/CF_Cabo-Verde-v.7.pdf [accessed 15 January 2026].
[11] World Bank, Cabo Verde Economic Update 2025: Unlocking Inclusive Growth through Increased Resilience and Equal Opportunities (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025).
[12] United States Department of State, 2025 Investment Climate Statements: Cabo Verde (2025), https://www.state.gov/reports/2025-investment-climate-statements/cabo-verde [accessed 21 January 2026]
[13] Aparicio, Javier, and Covadonga Meseguer, ‘Collective Remittances and the State: The 3x1 Program in Mexican Municipalities’, World Development, 40.1 (2012), 206–22 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.05.006
[14] See ‘Droit de vote à la diaspora: une question qui divise toujours’, L’Express, 24 June 2020 https://lexpress.mu/article/382468/droit-vote-diaspora-une-question-qui-divise-toujours [accessed 7 January 2026]; ‘Droit de vote pour la diaspora: une plainte en Cour suprême relance le débat’, Défi Media, 2024 https://defimedia.info/droit-de-vote-pour-la-diaspora-une-plainte-en-cour-supreme-relance-le-debat [accessed 7 January 2026]; ‘The bad idea of diaspora getting voting rights’, Lalit Mauritius, 2024 https://www.lalitmauritius.org/en/newsarticle/3687/the-bad-idea-of-diaspora-getting-voting-rights/ [accessed 7 January 2026].
[15] Granting voting rights to Mauritian citizens irrespective of their length of expatriation also does away with notions that are arbitrary, if not outright untenable, such as the idea, repeated by political figures, that a person who had emigrated fifty years ago shouldn’t be allowed to vote. One cannot correlate, in any measurable way, a Mauritian’s ties to their home country with the number of years they have spent abroad.
[16] ‘Personal Remittances Received’, World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT?locations=MU [accessed 8 January 2026].
[17] Neil Johnston and others, ‘Voting from Abroad’, UK Parliament House of Commons Library, 18 September 2024 https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05923/ [accessed 7 January 2026].
[18] ‘Italiani all’estero: Voto all’estero’, Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale https://www.esteri.it/en/servizi-consolari-e-visti/italiani-all-estero/votoestero/ [accessed 7 January 2026].
[19] ‘Elections of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament’, State Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia https://www.izbori.hr/site/en/elections-referenda/elections-of-representatives-to-the-croatian-parliament/1724 [accessed 7 January 2026].
[20] Shuji Yamauchi and Takashi Sekiyama, ‘Comparing the Election Systems for Overseas Constituency Representatives in Multiple Countries’, Social Sciences, 13:177 (2024), 1-13.
[21] Constitution of the Republic of Cabo Verde, Art. 113, para. 2.
[22] ‘Democracy Tracker: Lebanon’, International IDEA https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/lebanon [accessed 7 January 2026]; and Michael Young, ‘Deactivating the Diaspora’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 23 October 2025 https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2025/10/deactivating-the-diaspora?lang=en [accessed 7 January 2026].
[23] At Bridge Moris, we believe that the definition of a diaspora member should be expansive: it should include everyone with a form of Mauritian identity issued by the government, whether through the Identity Card or a passport. If technology allows, one could even pre-register on a dedicated portal attached to the consulate.
[24] Sven Heiberg and Jan Willemson, ‘Verifiable Internet Voting in Estonia’, in Electronic Voting: Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Electronic Voting (EVOTE2014), ed. by Robert Krimmer and Melanie Volkamer (Bregenz: Gesellschaft für Informatik, 2014; repr. with 2023 updates), pp. 1–10.
[25] ‘Diaspora Voting Rights in the Mauritian electoral reform’, Change.org https://www.change.org/p/diaspora-voting-rights-in-the-mauritian-electoral-reform [accessed 12 January 2026].
[26] ‘Program 3x1 for Migrants’, MICIC Initiative https://micicinitiative.iom.int/program-3x1-migrants-0 [accessed 15 January 2026].
[27] ‘Record Numbers of Mexicans Abroad Vote in Historic Election’, Mexico News Daily, 4 June 2024 https://mexiconewsdaily.com/mexico-elections-2024/mexicans-abroad-vote-historic-election/ [accessed 15 January 2026].